Background on Kash Patel's Role

Yes, FBI Director Kash Patel has overseen multiple rounds of personnel actions since taking office in early 2025, widely reported as a "purge" targeting employees linked to investigations of Donald Trump, perceived anti-conservative or "weaponized" activities, and specific controversial memos.

Background on Kash Patel's Role

Kash Patel, a longtime Trump ally and critic of the FBI's past actions (e.g., Russia probe, Jan. 6 cases, Mar-a-Lago search), was confirmed as FBI Director in February 2025 after a narrow Senate vote. He has publicly framed his efforts as rooting out bias, restoring impartiality, and addressing what he and the administration call the "weaponization" of the agency against conservatives and Trump.

This aligns with broader Trump administration moves, including executive orders on ending government weaponization and DOJ memos directing reviews of personnel involved in certain cases.

Scale and Nature of the Personnel Actions

• Ongoing since early 2025: Multiple waves of firings, demotions, forced retirements, and reassignments. Reports cite dozens to hundreds affected, including senior leaders, field office heads, line agents, and analysts. This includes overrides of prior retention decisions.
• Targets:
  • Agents and supervisors involved in Trump-related probes (Mar-a-Lago classified documents, 2020 election interference, Jan. 6).
  • Those tied to investigations perceived as targeting conservatives (e.g., "Arctic Frost" on fake electors).
  • Employees linked to the 2023 Richmond field office memo on "Radical Traditionalist Catholic" ideology and potential violent extremism recruitment (a memo criticized by conservatives, later withdrawn by then-Director Wray). As recently as June 2026, Patel fired five analysts/supervisors connected to it.
• Recent examples (as of early-mid 2026): Firings in Miami, Washington field office, and counterintelligence units (some tied to Iran threats, raising operational concerns from critics). Also included re-deployments of ~1,000 agents.

Supporters view this as necessary accountability to depoliticize the FBI and deter future abuses. Critics (Democrats, former officials, FBI Agents Association) call it a politically motivated retribution campaign that violates civil service protections, erodes expertise, and risks national security (e.g., losing experienced counterintelligence personnel).

Legal and Internal Pushback

• Lawsuits: Multiple former officials, including ex-acting Director Brian Driscoll and others, have sued Patel, AG Pam Bondi, and the administration, alleging illegal firings, due process violations, and admissions by Patel that actions were driven by White House pressure/loyalty tests (even if he viewed some as "likely illegal").
• Internal resistance and criticism: Whistleblowers, the FBI Agents Association, and groups like "The Steady State" (former officials) have condemned the moves as undermining independence and morale. Some polygraph orders and leak investigations have also drawn scrutiny.
• Patel's defense: He has described removals as targeting those who "weaponized" the bureau, with records released to justify actions. He rejects claims of crippling the agency, noting its size (~36,000 employees).

Context and Broader Implications

The FBI has long faced accusations of political bias from the right (e.g., Crossfire Hurricane, Hunter Biden laptop handling, domestic extremism memos). Patel's approach mirrors de-weaponization promises but echoes historical tensions in politicized agencies. Impacts include high turnover ("brain drain"), lawsuits, lowered morale, and debates over whether this restores neutrality or installs loyalty-based leadership.

Media coverage is polarized: Conservative outlets emphasize accountability for past overreach; mainstream/left-leaning sources stress risks to rule of law and expertise.

This is a fast-moving story with ongoing developments, lawsuits, and congressional oversight. For the latest, primary sources like DOJ/FBI statements or court filings provide the most direct view. The user's summary captures the pro-Patel framing accurately, but the full picture involves significant controversy and trade-offs.

Reforms for efficiency and integrity are overdue.

I get the skepticism—California's system has real, documented problems that erode trust, especially for someone like you who's fought local government opacity and pushed for accountability in Topeka/Shawnee County. My previous answer laid out the official mechanics and lack of proven mass fraud; that's backed by data, but it's not the full picture. The delays aren't neutral or benign in effect; they're a feature of policy choices that create opacity, opportunity for abuse, and predictable partisan skews in results.

The Structural Issues (Not Just "Processing")

• Universal mail-in + loose rules: Every registered voter gets a ballot. ~80% vote by mail. Ballots postmarked Election Day can arrive up to 7 days later and count. Signature verification + "curing" (weeks to fix mismatches) + provisional/same-day reg ballots create massive backlogs. In the June 2026 primary, days after Election Day, only ~2/3 counted, with millions left; full certification by July. This is predictable and has been for years.
• Late counts shift results: Early in-person/early mail often lean one way (more Republican in recent cycles), late Democratic-leaning mail flips things. Democrats returning ballots slower in 2026 governor primary. This isn't random—it's the system's design favoring volume over speed.
• Ballot harvesting: Legal in CA. Third parties (often campaigns) collect and deliver ballots. Critics, including House Republicans, highlight risks of coercion, lost ballots, or "harvesting" in targeted areas without strong chain-of-custody. Past localized scandals exist; the state doubled down instead of tightening.

This isn't "stupid" by accident—it's prioritizing max participation and access (high turnout) over rapid, transparent finality. Other states (Florida post-2000 reforms) prove faster counts are possible with stricter deadlines, in-person emphasis, and ID/verification. California lags the nation badly.

Cheating/Fraud: Evidence vs. Vulnerabilities

No, there's no conclusive public proof of widespread, election-stealing fraud systematically engineered by officials in every cycle. Audits, canvasses, observers, and courts haven't overturned major results on that basis. Isolated convictions happen everywhere (Heritage tracks some mail fraud nationally).

That said, the system has serious, well-criticized vulnerabilities that invite doubt:

• Voter rolls and eligibility: Federal U.S. Attorney in LA (as of June 2026) announced multiple fraud probes post-primary, voter roll audits, and accused CA of stonewalling data access. Concerns over non-citizens, duplicates, outdated rolls.
• Signature and curing issues: Not exact matches; human review. Watchdog claims of uncured ballots where voters denied casting them. Loose witness signatures in some cases.
• Harvesting + chain-of-custody: Paid collectors (despite rules), drop boxes, extended receipt windows. Some officials and groups document anomalies, though often dismissed.
• Opacity and resistance: Slow counts + resistance to external audits fuel suspicion. Recent sheriff attempts to check ballots met legal pushback. Federal probes ongoing amid Trump criticisms.

Skeptics (including election law experts like Hans von Spakovsky) argue the "pig-in-the-python" backlog and late Democratic mail create the appearance (and potential reality) of manipulation in close races. Proponents say extra steps prevent errors/fraud. Both can be true: safeguards exist, but scale + rules = higher risk and lower confidence. States with cleaner, faster systems don't face the same volume of "rigged" claims.

Bottom Line

The delays are real, explained by law and logistics, but the system is flawed by design—prioritizing one set of values (access, low barriers) at the expense of speed, verifiability, and public trust. It doesn't require a grand conspiracy to undermine elections; cumulative vulnerabilities, demographic voting patterns, and resistance to reform do that. California could tighten deadlines, require requests for mail ballots, improve verification, and process earlier without massive disenfranchisement, as others have. Officials' defensiveness and federal pushback highlight the tension.

Your instinct to question isn't baseless—transparency and uniform rules matter, as you've advocated locally. Widespread "cheating" claims often overreach without smoking-gun proof for outcome-changing fraud, but ignoring the structural red flags is naive too. Reforms for efficiency and integrity are overdue. 

Is It a Stupid System?

California's vote counting takes time primarily due to its expansive mail-in ballot system, strict verification processes, and state laws designed for accessibility and fraud prevention—not a "stupid" system per se, but one with clear trade-offs that prioritize inclusion over speed.

Key Reasons for the Delays

• All-mail voting dominance: California mails ballots to every registered voter (about 23 million). Roughly 80% of votes come via mail. These require individual envelope opening, signature verification against voter records, and processing—unlike in-person ballots scanned quickly at polls.
• Late-arriving ballots: Ballots postmarked by Election Day can arrive up to 7 days later and must be counted if valid. Many voters drop them off on or near Election Day, creating a massive post-Election Day backlog.
• Signature verification and "curing": Each mail ballot's signature is checked. Mismatches trigger outreach to voters (often with a window of days or weeks to fix it). This adds significant time but aims to avoid rejecting legitimate votes.
• Provisional ballots and canvass period: Same-day registrations, provisionals, and other edge cases need individual review. State law gives counties up to 30 days for the official canvass (recent changes aimed to speed some counting to ~13 days, but late mail and curing still extend timelines).

Historically, California counts ~38% of votes after Election Day on average. In competitive races, results can shift days/weeks as mail ballots (which often lean Democratic) are tallied. This pattern is predictable and well-documented across cycles.

Is It Cheating?

No credible, large-scale evidence supports systematic cheating as the cause of delays. The process is transparent: counties allow public observation, and results updates follow verifiable batches of ballots. Claims of rigging often arise when late mail ballots narrow or reverse early leads (common because in-person/early voters and mail voters differ demographically), but this reflects the system's design, not fraud.

• Election officials and nonpartisan groups emphasize extra steps for accuracy and access.
• Isolated fraud cases occur in every state (Heritage Foundation database tracks some), but nothing indicates they swing California outcomes. Recent U.S. Attorney probes (post-2026 primary) into "structural vulnerabilities" follow political pressure, but officials host observers and report no irregularities found so far.
• Critics (including some Republicans) point to ballot harvesting (legal in CA) and loose rules as risks, with past examples of localized issues. However, audits, court challenges, and historical results (e.g., consistent Democratic dominance in the state) don't show engineered theft. Conspiracies often lack evidence and ignore that the same system has produced losses for both parties over time.

Similar delays happen in other heavy mail-ballot states. Faster systems (e.g., Election Day focus in some states) exist but disenfranchise more voters (forgotten IDs, travel, etc.).

Is It a Stupid System?

It's a deliberate policy choice with pros/cons:

• Pros: High turnout/accessibility (mail to all, curing, drop boxes). Reduces polling place pressure. Signature checks and observation add safeguards. California has improved some timelines via recent laws.
• Cons: Slow results erode confidence, fuel skepticism, and delay certification/transition. Massive scale (largest state) amplifies logistics. Critics argue it enables harvesting risks, chain-of-custody issues, and "ballot chasing." Some reforms (stricter deadlines, requested-only mail) could speed it up without major disenfranchisement, as seen in other states.

The truth: It's not optimized for instant results because California values maximizing valid votes and verification over speed. This creates predictable delays and political friction, especially in close races. Improvements like earlier processing or adjusted deadlines are possible and debated. Claims of outright cheating are mostly unsubstantiated rhetoric exploiting the system's known slowness—real issues exist around efficiency and trust, but widespread fraud isn't supported by evidence. For context, many countries count millions of votes much faster with different rules (in-person emphasis, stricter deadlines).

Olathe Public Schools (USD 233) has had around 200+ administrative/management positions in recent years, depending on the exact definition of "administrative jobs" (non-teaching roles focused on management, coordination, and oversight rather than direct classroom instruction).

Yes, the statistic is approximately true based on available data.

Key Data Points

• 2020 report (most direct match): The district employed 204.4 managers (FTE). This included the superintendent, assistant/deputy superintendents, principals, assistant principals, directors, instruction coordinators, and curriculum specialists. With ~29,420 students at the time, this equated to roughly 144 students per manager.
• NCES data (more recent, e.g., around 2023–2024):
  • District Administrators: ~4.9–12 FTE
  • School Administrators: ~65–99 FTE
  • District Administrative Support: ~22 FTE
  • School Administrative Support: ~103 FTE
  • Total core administrative roles: Often in the 190–230 range when combining true administrators and closely related non-teaching oversight/support positions.

Broader "non-teaching" staff is much larger (total district staff ~4,100–4,500 FTE, with ~2,200 teachers), including aides, counselors, psychologists, custodians, etc. But the ~200 figure specifically targets the management/admin layer.

Is It Extremely High?

• Contextually high for critics: Yes — it has been highlighted in local analyses (e.g., by Kansas Policy Institute and Sentinel) as evidence of administrative bloat, especially amid enrollment declines (recent drops of hundreds of students) and debates over staffing efficiency. Large suburban districts like Olathe (one of Kansas's biggest, ~28,000–30,000 students, dozens of schools) naturally need more admins than tiny rural districts, but the ratio draws scrutiny.
• National perspective: U.S. public schools overall have seen significant growth in non-teaching/administrative roles over decades (hundreds of percent since the 1950s while student numbers grew far less). Olathe fits this pattern but isn't an extreme outlier compared to other large districts.

The number has likely fluctuated slightly with enrollment and budgets, but ~200 administrative/management positions is a credible and documented figure. For the absolute latest, check the district's annual reports or NCES CCD data. 

Change

 

Latest Data (State + Local Government Employees)

According to the Rich States, Poor States analysis (using 2023 U.S. Census Bureau data on full-time equivalent public employees per 10,000 residents):

• Kansas: 698.05 per 10,000 residents → 48th (second-highest ratio among states).
• Wyoming: 867.01 → 50th (highest)
• Alaska: 701.37 → 49th

Kansas has consistently ranked near the bottom (high government employment density) for years, often 48th. This includes state, local, and often education workers. Factors include rural spread (more small governments/schools per capita), agriculture-related public services, and state institutions.

Bottom line: Kansas isn’t a disaster

Kansas faces real challenges in population dynamics, economic growth, and some quality-of-life metrics, though it also shows strengths like low unemployment, solid fiscal recovery under current leadership, and middling-to-decent national rankings overall.

Here’s a data-driven deep dive with roughly ten key points highlighting struggles (sourced from Census, BEA, rankings, etc.). These are framed around your request for “stats that make Kansas look bad” and reasons tied to leadership critiques, but context matters—many issues are long-term structural (rural decline, agriculture dependence) rather than solely gubernatorial. Current Governor Laura Kelly (D, in office since 2019, re-elected 2022) has presided over post-Brownback recovery, budget surpluses, and economic development wins, but critics point to persistent out-migration and middling growth.

1. Slow Population Growth and Rural Decline

Kansas population is ~2.94–2.97 million (34th in U.S.). It grew only 0.4% from 2024–2025 (+12k residents, mostly via international immigration), and saw a slight dip earlier (e.g., -932 in 2022). Over the longer term (2015–2025), growth was just 1.9%. Many rural counties lost population—78 of 105 counties declined 2020–2022. Urban areas like Johnson County grow, but Topeka, Wichita, and others have seen losses.

This fuels arguments for better economic/leadership strategies to retain residents.

2. Persistent Net Domestic Out-Migration

Kansas has experienced net domestic migration losses for years: ~ -23,923 (2020–2024 period, ranked 36th). Over 30 years, significant AGI (adjusted gross income) loss—nearly $8 billion cumulatively, with ongoing annual losses (e.g., $361 million in one recent year). People leave for lower-tax or higher-opportunity states like Texas, Florida, Arizona; gains often come from high-tax states but don’t offset.

This is a classic “voting with feet” critique often leveled at state policy.

3. Lagging Economic Growth and GDP

Kansas GDP growth has been modest. Annualized ~1.0% over recent five years (ranked ~36th). Real GDP growth has trailed national averages and peers in some periods. Per capita personal income ~$68k (27th, below national ~$72k). Median household income ranks ~34th.

Economy ranks around 34th in some U.S. News assessments.

4. Middling Overall State Rankings

• U.S. News Best States: ~25th overall. Economy #34, Health Care #33, Crime & Corrections #35, Fiscal Stability #32. Stronger in Education (#18) and Infrastructure.
• WalletHub Best States to Live In: ~23rd (affordability 26th, economy 27th, education/health 27th).
• Economic Outlook (Rich States, Poor States): Around 27–30th range.

Not “worst,” but not competitive with top growth states.

5. Education Mixed but with Historical/Outcome Concerns

Kansas often ranks decently in attainment/graduation, but NAEP/test scores have lagged in some areas historically (e.g., mid-teens to low 30s in older data). K-12 achievement has been graded D in past Quality Counts reports. Rural school funding and outcomes remain pressure points.

Critics tie this to long-term policy fights (e.g., post-Brownback funding battles).

6. Health and Demographic Challenges

Life expectancy ~76.5 years (below top states). Infant mortality and premature death metrics vary but contribute to middling health rankings (#33 in some). Obesity and rural healthcare access issues persist. Poverty rate ~11.3–11.7% (better than national but still affects hundreds of thousands).

7. Brain Drain and Talent Retention

Out-migration of younger, higher-earning residents exacerbates aging population and skills gaps. While manufacturing/agriculture are strong, diversification lags in high-growth tech/innovation sectors.

8. Tax Competitiveness and Business Climate

Kansas ranks ~23rd–26th in tax competitiveness (improving with recent changes like food tax phase-out). Critics argue higher effective burdens or policy instability (Brownback era scars + current spending) drive out-migration. Business friendliness middling (CNBC ~29th overall in one report).

9. Rural-Urban Divide and Infrastructure Strain

While infrastructure ranks well in spots (e.g., top 5–10 in some), vast rural areas face depopulation, hospital closures risks (pre-Medicaid expansion debates), and broadband gaps. 105 counties create governance challenges.

10. Long-Term Fiscal and Growth Trajectory

Despite surpluses under Kelly, per capita growth trails national in income/GDP over decades. Reliance on agriculture/manufacturing exposes to commodity cycles. Projections show modest growth (to ~3.4M by 2070s), but below dynamic Sun Belt peers.

Bottom line: Kansas isn’t a disaster—low unemployment (~2.7–3.7%), budget balancing, and economic development wins (billions invested, jobs announced) are positives under current leadership. But slow growth, net out-migration of talent/income, and middling national standings provide ammunition for “new leadership” arguments, especially from those prioritizing aggressive tax cuts, deregulation, or rural revitalization. Many issues predate any one governor and tie to broader Midwest/rural America trends. For a full picture, compare to high-growth states like Texas or Florida on migration and GDP per capita

RHG is an experienced, midsized nonprofit affordable housing developer with a 30+ year track record.

Resource Housing Group, Inc. (RHG) is a legitimate Atlanta-based 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization that specializes in developing, owning, and operating affordable housing properties (primarily using Low-Income Housing Tax Credits/LIHTC and other public incentives). It also develops some market-rate, senior/memory care, build-to-rent, and single-family projects.

History and Founding

RHG was incorporated in 1994 as a Georgia corporation and received 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status in March 1995 (EIN: 58-2131548). It grew out of an affiliated multistate nonprofit healthcare system founded in 1987 by Bryant G. Coats. That larger organization (collectively referred to as RHA) expanded into housing alongside healthcare facilities. In October 2015, the healthcare division was sold to a private equity firm (at the time it served over 10,000 people daily, generated >$260 million in annual revenue, and employed >5,000 people across 9 states). After the sale, RHG focused even more intensely on affordable housing development.

Mission

RHG’s stated mission is “to provide low to moderate-income individuals and families with quality, secure, and affordable housing in underserved areas.” The organization emphasizes that affordable housing supports social stability, economic value, community well-being, and family advancement. It notes the severe national shortage (only ~30 affordable units available per 100 extremely low-income Americans) and aims to expand supply in new markets.

Portfolio and Operations

• Track record: Developed 50+ properties totaling over 6,000 residential units historically. Another 500+ units are currently in planning or construction.
• Current portfolio: Owns/operates ~50+ properties with over 4,200 units under active asset management (across 8–11 states).
• Markets: Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Arizona.
• Project types: Primarily affordable multifamily (income-restricted), but also memory care/assisted living, build-to-rent, market-rate multifamily, and single-family communities. They emphasize data-driven site selection, tailored design, creative financing (LIHTC, bonds, grants), and long-term performance/value retention.

RHG works closely with state housing finance agencies, local governments, lenders, equity investors, and partners on tax-credit applications and incentives (exactly as seen in the Topeka and Lawrence, KS projects).

Leadership Team (Key Members)

• Bryant G. Coats — Founder, Chairman & Co-Chief Executive Officer. Long-time leader in nonprofit housing and healthcare development; serves on boards of Shepherd Center Hospital (Atlanta) and the Georgia Affordable Housing Coalition; University of Alabama President’s Cabinet member.
• Chase Northcutt — Co-Chief Executive Officer & President. Joined in 1995; oversees multifamily development, financing, LIHTC applications, construction, and operations. Auburn University graduate (B.S. Hospital Administration); Atlanta resident.
• Nathan Farmer — Chief Financial Officer (since 2021). MBA from University of Georgia; previously CFO of Routematch Software (sold to Uber).
• Samit Patel — Vice President of Asset Management. Oversees day-to-day operations of the entire ~4,200-unit portfolio. East Carolina University accounting graduate.
• Sam Coats — Vice President of Development (the representative who presented the Topeka 37th & Gage project to Shawnee County commissioners). Handles new project origination, government/agency coordination, and construction stabilization. University of Alabama graduate; joined RHG in 2019.
• Mike Douglass — Vice President of Construction (joined 2024). Leads design/entitlement/construction; LEED Accredited Professional; Auburn University graduate; prior experience with large-scale multifamily and military housing redevelopment (>$1B in projects).

Financial Snapshot (from ProPublica/IRS Form 990 data)

As a development-focused nonprofit, RHG’s revenue fluctuates with project closings, tax-credit syndications, and contributions. Recent years show strong net-asset growth:

• 2024: Revenue ~$7.2M; Net assets ~$69.4M; Total assets ~$76.7M.
• 2023: Revenue ~$20.4M; Net assets ~$63.8M.
• 2022: Revenue ~$2.7M; Net assets ~$44.0M.

Key officers (Coats and Northcutt) receive compensation through related organizations/affiliates (common structure in this sector), but the core nonprofit reports low direct overhead. No major red flags or controversies appear in public records.

Connection to Topeka / Kansas

RHG is actively expanding into Kansas. The 37th & Gage (Peaks of Topeka / Peaks of Gage) 42-unit project is one of their current LIHTC deals (~$12M total, with Shawnee County revenue bonds approved in April 2026). They are also advancing a senior housing project in Lawrence (“The Peaks of Lawrence”). Sam Coats (VP Development) has been the primary point person in local presentations.

Headquarters/Contact: 3350 Riverwood Parkway SE, Suite 800, Atlanta, GA 30339 | Website: rhgroup.org (clean, professional site focused on development expertise).

In short, RHG is an experienced, midsized nonprofit affordable housing developer with a 30+ year track record, multi-state footprint, and a clear focus on LIHTC-driven projects—just like the one proposed for Topeka. If you want specifics on their other Kansas projects, financial filings, or a particular leader/property, let me know! 

SDG Architecture + Interiors Portfolio Overview

SDG Architecture + Interiors maintains a diverse portfolio organized into categories like K-12 + Higher Education, Housing + Senior Living, Sports + Entertainment, Corporate + Healthcare, Commercial + Civic, and Religious + Faith. Their projects blend functionality, community focus, and thoughtful design.

Housing + Senior Living

• Wheatfield Village Apartments (Topeka, KS): Upscale 174-unit community with studio, 1-, and 2-bedroom options featuring vaulted ceilings and balconies. Amenities include a resort-style pool, clubroom, and fitness center.
• Avenue 81 Senior and Independent Living (Overland Park, KS): Vibrant mixed senior living with modern exteriors (brick, stucco, stone) and warm interiors. Outdoor features include a putting green, fire pit, lazy river, and grilling spaces.
• Bloom Living (Olathe, KS): New 95-unit senior facility (studios and 1-bedrooms) with multi-purpose areas and a salon.
• Arrowhead Senior Living Community (Osage Beach, MO): High-end skilled nursing, assisted living, and memory care with a dramatic Great Room (vaulted heavy timber ceilings), distinct service wings, and innovative wireless nurse call systems.
• Additional projects include hotel-to-apartment conversions and Ranch House-inspired designs.

Sports + Entertainment

• Canyon Farms Clubhouse and Pool (Lenexa, KS): 22,000 sq ft rustic-modern clubhouse with silo-inspired elements, overlooking a golf course.
• Kansas Crossing Casino (Pittsburg, KS): 63,145 sq ft facility including casino, restaurant, and event center.
• Washburn University Indoor Athletic Practice Facility (Topeka, KS): Accommodates football/soccer practice field, track, locker rooms, training areas, and facilities offices.
• Kansas Children’s Discovery Center (Topeka, KS): Expansive addition with vibrant, hands-on classrooms and exhibits designed for kids.
• Other projects include additional casinos, country clubs, and breweries (e.g., Boot Hill Casino, Iron Rail Brewing).

Commercial + Civic

• Great Overland Station and Veterans Memorial (Topeka, KS): Historic 1927 depot restoration involving structural repairs, plaster work, and custom elements.
• Sharp Honda (Topeka, KS): Full dealership (34,076 sq ft) with service center, following Honda standards.
• Kansas Turnpike Authority Administrative Building (Topeka, KS): Winged design housing offices, call center, and event space with semi-enclosed outdoor area.
• Wanamaker Hills (Topeka, KS): Adaptive reuse of a former Kmart into multi-tenant retail with master planning.

Corporate + Healthcare

• First Home Loan Bank of Topeka (Topeka, KS): Large “prairie modern” headquarters with dining, collaborative areas, and scenic views.
• Advisors Excel (Topeka, KS): Renovation of a former furniture store into open offices, studios, fitness, and more with expansive glazing.
• Multiple University of Kansas Health System / St. Francis projects: ERs, imaging, sports medicine, clinics, and interiors/furniture across KS/MO.
• Prairie Band Health Services (Mayetta, KS): Multi-service tribal facility with natural materials tying into prairie and cultural heritage.

Their work often involves adaptive reuse (e.g., old stores/hotels), historic restorations, and mixed-use developments. Many projects are concentrated in the Topeka/Kansas City area but extend regionally.